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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Decay heat removal at depressurized shutdown conditions has been regarded as one of 
the key areas where significant improvement in passive response was targeted for the 
GEN IV GFR over the GCFR designs of thirty years ago. It has been recognized that the 
poor heat transfer characteristics of gas coolant at lower pressures needed to be 
accommodated in the GEN IV design. The design envelope has therefore been extended 
to include a station blackout sequence simultaneous with a small break/leak. After an 
exploratory phase of scoping analysis in this project, together with CEA of France [1], it 
was decided that natural convection would be selected as the passive decay heat removal 
approach of preference. Furthermore, a double vessel/containment option, similar to the 
double vessel/guard vessel approach of the SFR, was selected as the means of design 
implementation to reduce the PRA risks of the depressurization accident. However 
additional calculations in conjunction with CEA showed that there was an economic 
penalty in terms of decay heat removal system heat exchanger size, elevation heights for 
thermal centers, and most of all in guard containment back pressure for complete reliance 
on natural convection only. The back pressure ranges complicated the design 
requirements for the guard containment. Recognizing that the definition of a loss-of-
coolant-accident in the GFR is a misnomer, since gas coolant will always be present, and 
the availability of some driven blower would reduce fuel temperature transients 
significantly; it was decided instead to aim for a hybrid active/passive combination 
approach to the selected BDBA. Complete natural convection only would still be relied 
on for decay heat removal but only after the first twenty four hours after the initiation of 
the accident. During the first twenty four hour period an actively powered blower would 
be relied on to provide the emergency decay power removal. However the power 
requirements of the active blower/circulators would be kept low by maintaining a 
pressurized system coolant back pressure of ~7-8 bars through the design of the guard 
containment for such a design pressure. This approach is termed the medium pressure 
approach by both CEA and the US. Such a containment design pressure is in the range of 
the LWR experience, both PWRs and BWRs. Both metal containments and concrete 
guard containments are possible in this pressure range. This approach is then a time-at-
risk approach as the power requirements should be low enough that battery/fuel cell 
banks without diesel generator start-up failure rate issues should be capable of providing 
the necessary power. Compressed gas sources are another possibility. A companion PRA 
study is being conducted [2] to survey the reliability of such systems. 
 
The decay heat calculations documented in this report are the first analyses for the US 
GEN IV GFR design to confirm the efficacy of the proposed hybrid active/passive 
combination for the GEN IV GFR shutdown decay heat removal events under the BDBA 
conditions. Decay heat removal by a combination of active and passive means has been 
analyzed for a 2400 MWt direct-cycle gas cooled fast reactor (GCFR). Previously, 
transient calculations [3, 4] of passive decay heat removal by natural circulation cooling 
in a depressurization accident were done with a simplified representation of the power 
conversion unit (PCU). In the simplified model the coast down of the PCU flow was 
prescribed as boundary conditions and all the components of the PCU were modeled as 
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simple hydraulic volumes. This topical report presents an updated RELAP5 model of the 
GFR plant system and discusses results of a study that considered decay heat removal by 
both active and passive means. One of the significant updates is the addition of active 
components (rotating machines and heat exchangers) to the PCU model. Results of the 
new analyses confirm that the coast down of the turbomachine of the PCU plays an 
important role in the early response of the reactor system following a breach in the 
pressure boundary. Another modification to the model is the implementation of Reynolds 
number dependent loss coefficient for the spacers in the pin core. This change has proved 
to have negative impact on decay heat removal by natural circulation because of 
increased form loss in the core under reduced flow conditions. Natural circulation cooling 
is shown to be sufficient to removal decay heat 24 hours after reactor shutdown when the 
guard containment pressure is maintained at 800kPa. 
 
In addition to these promising results for the base case and the reference DHR design, 
additional parametric analyses have been performed to examine the phenomenology of 
the natural convection flow through the core, the PCU and the primary system. In 
particular, insightful results have been obtained on the topic of core bypass flow. The 
need for check valves, better understanding of thermal centers, particularly in the PCU, 
have all been explored. These insights will be used in the future effort to optimize the 
role of the PCU in the transition to natural convection removal of decay heat. 
 
2.0 RELAP5 MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
A RELAP5 model of the reactor system has been constructed to address different 
parametric effects that influence the steady state and transient behavior of a 2400 MWt 
pin core in a depressurization accident [3, 4]. Details of the model can be found in the 
references and only salient features will be highlighted here.  
 
The model, as shown schematically in Figure 1, consists of the reactor, two power 
conversion system loops, an emergency heat exchanger loop with its heat sink, and a 
guard containment surrounding the primary system. The two power conversion system 
loops consists of one and three PCU’s respectively with each PCU rated at 600MW.This 
two-loop arrangement is to facilitate analysis of potential asymmetric effects during a 
transient.  
 
The RELAP5 representations of the primary system and the power conversion unit (PCU) 
by hydraulic volumes are shown in Figure 2. The core has three regions representing the 
fueled section (multiple channels with different power), the reflector and shield regions. 
 
 The emergency cooling system (ECS) is sized to handle 2% decay heat removal by 
natural convection in a 4x50% configuration, i.e. four separate loops of 1% power 
capacity. In the RELAP5 model the emergency heat removal system is represented by a 
single loop with a 2x50% capacity and one heat exchanger, which is sized to handle 2% 
of full power. A battery powered blower downstream of the heat exchanger is sized to 
provide sufficient forced flow cooling during the first 24 hours after a reactor shutdown. 
Details of the volume representation of the ECS are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 1 – GFR System with Emergency Cooling Loop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Reactor Vessel and Power Conversion Unit Volume Arrangement. 
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Figure 3 – Schematic of Emergency Cooling System. 
 
After 24 hours the blower will be turned off and natural circulation kicks in to remove 
decay heat. Radiative heat transfer is incorporated in the RELAP5 model of the GFR 
system. Shown in Figure 4 is the conceptual arrangement of heat structures involved in 
the heat transfer by radiation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Heat Structures for Radiative Heat Transfer. 
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The RELAP5 model also includes the reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS), an active 
system that absorbs radiant heat from the reactor vessel and removes heat from the guard 
containment atmosphere by natural convection. The general arrangement of heat 
structures as modeled in RELAP5 is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Reactor Vessel and Guard Containment Heat Structures. 
 
 
3.0 GT-MHR POWER CONVERSION UNIT 
 
The RELAP5 model of the power conversion unit (PCU) is based on a design that is 
being developed by General Atomics (GA) and its Russian partner for a 600 MWt Gas 
Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR). Conceptual design of the GT-MHR was 
done by GA [5] and further development is being carried out in Russia with support from 
the US government [6]. A PCU has two major parts, the turbomachine and the heat 
exchangers. A node diagram showing the gas volumes in a PCU is shown in Figure 2. 
 
The components of a PCU are housed in a vertical vessel that is placed near the reactor. 
The PCU and the reactor are connected by a short cross vessel that is made up of an inner 
hot duct and a concentric outer cold duct. Components of the turbomachine, namely, the 
generator, turbine, low and high pressure compressors, are all on one shaft. The heat 
exchangers consist of recuperator, precooler, and intercooler. A bypass valve that 
connects the high and low pressure side of the PCU is used for the over-speed protection 
of the turbine. Details of the RELAP5 model of the PCU are given in Reference [7]. 
 
  6
Since the performance data for the multi-stage turbine is not available only an 
approximate RELAP5 model is used to represent the gas turbine. It is modeled as a single 
stage type 2 turbine, i.e. constant efficient stage. 
  
The high and low pressure compressors are represented by using the newly added 
compressor component in RELAP5. Again only approximate performance characteristics 
are used to model the compressors. The performance curves are in tabular form. For each 
speed, the compression ratio and the efficiency are specified as a function of flow. The 
performance data for the PCU model are based on information from INL [8]. The INL 
data (see Figure 6) were derived from design calculations provided by MIT for the 
recompressing compressor of a CO2 system. In applying the data to the current analysis 
the data were renormalized to the rated or nominal conditions of the GT-MHR 
compressors. The same set of curves was used for both the high and low pressure 
compressors. 
 
                   
 
Figure 6 – Compressor Performance Curves (from INL). 
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The calculation will terminate with an error whenever the compressor experiences 
conditions predicted by the code that are outside the performance curves. In order to 
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the PCU. This again creates an error in the compressor module of RELAP5. This 
difficulty is overcome in the calculation by replacing the compressors with regular 
hydraulic volumes when a pre-determined level of low flow is reached. Without the 
compressors the PCU flow drops to zero rapidly. This effect from eliminating the 
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Located in the annular space between the turbine-compressors and the PCU vessel is the 
recuperator, the precooler and the intercooler. The coolers are cooled by running water 
that transfers heat to the ultimate heat sink. The recuperator is a vertical modular heat 
exchanger with plate-fin heat transfer surface and operating with countercurrent flow (see 
Figure 7). The precooler and the intercooler have similar design. They are both modular 
vertical heat exchangers. Each module consists of a number of straight tubes with outer 
fins and the tubes are arranged in a triangular array (see Figure 8). Cooling water flows 
inside the tubes. A displacer rod located inside each tube enhances the heat transfer by 
increasing the flow velocity. Helium flows on the outside of the tubes, countercurrent to 
the water flow. 
 
 
                                               
 
Figure 7 – Plate-Fin Heat Transfer Surfaces in the Recouperator. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Finned Tubes in the Precooler and Intercooler. 
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4.0 SPACER LOSS COEFFICIENT 
 
The helium flow through the core enters the laminar flow regime when natural circulation 
is established subsequent to the stoppage of the battery powered blower. It is important to 
recognize in the calculation that form losses of the grid spacer can become significant for 
the pin core design when the flow is laminar. In the updated model of the GFR core the 
implementation of the dependence of spacer form losses on Reynolds number is based on 
an evaluation performed by Hejzlar [9]. It is noted in Figure 9 that for Reynolds number 
(RN) above 1x104, both the laminar (Cl) and turbulent (Ct) form of the correlation 
provide almost the same value for the form loss coefficient. At the rated core flow, the 
Reynolds number in the core region is in the range of 4-6x104. As a simplification for the 
calculation, the laminar form of the form loss correlation is assumed to apply for the full 
range of Reynolds numbers. 
 
10 100 1 .103 1 .104 1 .105 1 .106
1
10
100
1 .103
1 .104
1 .105
1.604 104×
6.005
C t RNn( )
C l RNn( )
1 106×10 RNn
 
 
Figure 9 – Form Loss Coefficients for Laminar and Turbulent Flow. 
 
The following spacer loss coefficients are used in the calculation and the velocity (v) and 
the Reynolds number (Re) are based on the free flow area of the channel (i.e. without the 
spacers). 
 
K = 0.59 + 2850/Re    (for the fueled region) 
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K = 0.74 + 3570/Re    (for the reflector and shield regions) 
 
where the pressure drop due to form loss is calculated by, 
 
∆p = K ρ v2 / 2 
 
At rated flow condition the above two form loss coefficients approach the previously 
assumed constant values of 0.65 and 0.80 for the fueled and reflector/shield regions 
respectively. The effects of the increased form loss on natural circulation flow will be 
discussed later in relation to the results of the transient analysis. 
 
5.0 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 
 
A series of RELAP5 transient calculations has been performed to analyze the decay heat 
removal capability of the GFR design in a depressurization accident. The transients are 
analyzed by using RELAP5-3D, version 2.4.1.1a.  
 
The latest input model of the GFR includes four modifications: integration of the PCU to 
the reactor system, Reynolds number dependent spacer grid loss, addition of heat 
structures to represent piping of the Emergency Cooling System, and the addition of a 
time-dependent junction to represent the blower in the ECS loop. The significant 
influence of stored energy in heat structures on the temperature of helium after reactor 
shutdown has been demonstrated by Hejzlar [10]. Heat structures for the hot and cold 
ducts of the PCU are based on the model described in reference [10]. The power, Wb, 
required to run the blower is estimated by calculating the rate of work done on the helium 
flow. 
 
Wb = (∆Pb) . Ab . Vb 
 
where (∆Pb)  is the pressure differential across the blower junction,; Ab is the blower 
junction flow area; Vb is the blower flow velocity , a specified boundary condition for the 
time-dependent junction representing the blower. Vb is zero when the blower is off. A 
separate flow path parallel with the blower junction is used to simulate the condition of a 
non-running blower. This flow path is equipped with a trip valve that is open only when 
the blower is not running and a local loss is specified to represent the flow resistance 
from a stopped blower. 
 
The depressurization accident is initiated by a break in the reactor pressure boundary 
(assumed at the high point of the reactor vessel) followed by a scram on low system 
pressure. One of the initial observations from the results of the new RELAP5 model is 
that the compressors are able to slow down the depressurization and delay the reactor 
scram on pressure. Since the main interest of the analysis is to assess the decay heat 
removal capability a 10 sq. inch break is used instead of the previous 1 sq. inch to shorten 
the time between break initiation and reactor scram. The timeline for one of the cases 
(Case 17) is shown in Table 1 below to illustrate the accident scenario. 
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Table 1 – Timeline for Case 17 
 
0 s 10 sq. in. break initiated. 
148.08 s Reactor tripped on low pressure. Generator tripped off line and turbine 
bypass is opened. 
215.65 s Turbine bypass re-closed when PCU flow dropped below 20% of rated 
value. 
390.48 s Compressors replaced by dummy volumes when PCU flow again dropped 
below 20% of rated value. 
420 s Blower turned on with a flow velocity of 3.5 m/s. 
9000 s Case restarted by defining reactor power as a function of time in the form 
of a table. Reactor power decayed linearly from 26.2407MW at t=9000s to 
13.9748 MW at t=15000s. The later power level is equivalent to the decay 
power 24 hours after a shutdown.  
9010 s Trip valve located at the junction between the PCU outlet and the reactor 
downcomer was closed. This was used to simulate the action of a check 
valve that would have prevented flow from entering the PCU via the 
reactor downcomer. 
15000 s Blower speed reduced to zero in 5 seconds. Reactor power was maintained 
constant at the 24-hour decay heat level. 
25000 s Case ended. 
 
Simultaneous with the scram the accident scenario assumes a generator trip and the 
opening of the PCU turbine bypass valve. With a sudden loss of load (generator trip) the 
excess mechanical energy will drive the shaft of the turbomachine to very high rotational 
speed. Over-speed protection is provided by the opening of turbine bypass valves that are 
assumed to fully open in 1 second in the current analysis. The rotational speed of the 
shaft is shown in Figure 10. The rate of the decay in the shaft speed is a function of the 
frictional torque and the value is assumed in the calculation to result in a coast down time 
of about 800s.  
 
With the bypass valve open most of the helium flow inside the PCU just re-circulates 
between the high and low pressure compressors. The sudden drop in reactor pressure, as 
shown in Figure 11, at t=~150s corresponds with the bypass valve action. 
  
The flow through a single PCU is illustrated in Figure12. The spike in flow at about 150s 
is due to the spinning up of the shaft when the generator is tripped off line.  
 
As a way to restore full turbine output, the bypass valve is re-closed at t=~220s. Both the 
pressure and flow respond positively. The effect of replacing the compressors with 
regular hydraulic volumes is quite obvious in Figure 12 where the PCU flow drops to 
zero rapidly. It is also of interest to point out that the wiggles in the flow in Figure 12 at 
about 50s are due to the transition from one compressor performance curve to another. 
The transitions may not be continuous because part of the operating envelope is based on 
extrapolations. 
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According to Figure 12 natural circulation flow through the ECS heat exchanger is 
established when the PCU flow ceases at about 390s. At t=420s a blower with a gas 
velocity of 3.5m/s is turned on resulting in a mass flow rate that is more than twice the 
natural circulation flow. Over time as the density of the helium decreases with decreasing 
pressure, the blower flow rate also decreases. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Rotational Speed of the Shaft. 
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Figure 11 – Reactor and Guard Containment Pressures. 
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Figure 12 – Flow through PCU and the ECS Heat Exchanger. 
 
The helium flow rates at the inlet and outlet of the core are shown in Figure 13. There is 
little difference in magnitude between the two flow rates and they generally trend 
consistently with the composite of PCU and ECS flows, as shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 13 – Helium Flow at Core Inlet and Outlet. 
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An important safety parameter of interest is the core outlet temperature. This is illustrated 
in Figure 14 together with the core inlet temperature. Unlike the core flow there is 
significant difference between the core inlet and outlet temperature responses during the 
depressurization accident. As the reactor pressure drops by about 2.5MPa at t=150s, the 
core inlet sees a corresponding drop in temperature by more than 300 degrees K. This 
behavior is consistent with the response expected of a compressible fluid. The core outlet 
on the other hand shows much less perturbation in its temperature. This is because the 
drop in temperature due to expansion is somewhat counter-balanced by a rise in 
temperature due to a decrease in core flow. When the reactor pressure recovers after the 
re-closing of the turbine bypass valve at t=215s, the compression causes an 
accompanying rise in core inlet temperature. The corresponding temperature at the core 
outlet however shows a continuing decline and the reason is due to a surge in core flow 
from the closure of the turbine bypass valve. There is another drop in core outlet 
temperature at approximately t=400s and this coincides with the initiation of natural 
circulation through the ECS and the arrival of cooled helium from the ECS heat 
exchanger. The rising trend of the core outlet temperature is consistent with the decay 
power exceeding the cooling power of the ECS heat exchanger during the early phase of 
the transient. 
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Figure 14 – Helium Temperature at Core Inlet and Outlet. 
 
It is shown in the next section of the report that the core is adequately cooled when the 
blower is running. It is then not necessary to simulate every second of the first 24 hours 
while the blower is in operation. A fast forward in time in simulation is done by linearly 
decreasing the reactor power from 26.2407MW at t=9000s to 13.9748MW at t=15000s. 
The later power level is equivalent to the decay power 24 hours after a shutdown. At 
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15000s the blower is turned off and the reactor power is maintained constant at the 24 
hour decay power level for the rest of the calculation. 
 
Preliminary results indicate that with the blower off the high pressure point of the system 
is in the downcomer of the reactor. There are two flow paths from the downcomer, one 
leads to the core and the other goes to the PCU via the cold duct. With the blower off 
RELAP5 predicts about half of the natural circulation flow bypassing the core and 
instead flows through the PCU in the reverse direction (normal flow is from the hot duct 
to the cold duct). The PCU bypass flow is prevented by simulating a check valve, 
installed at t=9010s, that isolates the PCU from the downcomer. 
 
Following the same sequence of events as described above, the depressurization accident 
is analyzed from time zero through 25000s for three cases and the results are discussed in 
the following section. 
 
6.0 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Three transient calculations plus several parametric runs have been done to illustrate the 
decay heat removal capability of a 2400MWt GCFR with a pin core. The different cases 
are run to assess the end results against variations in the accident scenario or the design of 
the system. In all cases the depressurization accident is initiated by a 0.0645m2 (10 in2) 
break at the high point of the reactor. All three transient cases (#17, 26 and 32) have a 
guard containment free volume of 2025m3.  Table 2 below provides a summary of the 
differences among the three transient cases and the four parametric cases. 
 
Table 2 – Case Definitions 
 
Case Definition 
17 Constant spacer loss coefficients (not Reynolds number dependent). Trip valve isolates PCU at t=9010s. 
26 Similar to Case 17 but have the spacer loss coefficient becoming Reynolds number dependent after t=13000s. 
32 
Similar to Case 17 but with Reynolds number dependent spacer loss implemented 
at t=1000s. 
Constant guard containment pressure of 800kPa is initiated at t=1250s. 
18 Similar to Case 17 but no trip valve to isolate PCU. Turbine bypass valve is re-opened at t=9010s. 
20 Similar to Case 17 but no trip valve to isolate PCU. ECS return is re-located to the bottom of downcomer. 
23 
Similar to Case 17 but no trip valve to isolate PCU. 
Pre-cooler and intercooler walls are insulated (i.e. no cooling by the coolers). 
Wall temperature is initialized to 400.15K. 
27 
Similar to Case 17 but with Reynolds number dependent spacer loss implemented 
at t=1000s. 
Guard containment free volume = 1512m3. 
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The success criteria for the transients are: 
 
1. Maximum fuel temperature less than 1600C (1873K) 
2. Maximum core outlet temperature (helium) less than 850C (1123K) 
 
Both Case 26 and 32 are restart cases. So they share the same result as for Case 17 up to 
the point of the restart, t=1300s for Case 26 and t=1000s for Case 32. 
 
Case 17 is a success case meeting both success criteria at the end of the calculation at 
t=25000s.  
 
Case 26 with the realistic spacer losses (Reynolds number dependent) results in reduced 
natural circulation (as compared to Case 17) and the core outlet temperature exceeding 
the success criterion. At the end of the calculation at t= 25000s the maximum fuel 
temperature has reached about 1400K and is still increasing.  
 
One of the ways to increase the natural circulation flow is by increasing the back pressure 
of the guard containment. In Case 32 this increase in back pressure is instituted by 
connecting a constant pressure time-dependent volume to the guard containment. The 
time-dependent volume, simulating a gas accumulator, maintains the back pressure at 
800kPa (8 bars) by injecting helium gas at 20C when necessary. At the end of the 
calculation at t=25000s, the core outlet temperature is about 1000K and the maximum 
fuel temperature is about 1100K. Both have reached a quasi-steady state value and are 
within the success criteria. Case 32 demonstrates that it is possible to rely on natural 
circulation flow alone to remove decay power 24 hours after shutdown. 
 
The following sections discuss the thermal-hydraulic response of some of the more 
important system parameters for the three cases during the depressurization transient.  
 
6.1 Heat Removal Rate of the Emergency Cooling System 
 
Plotted in Figures 15a and 15b is the rate of heat transfer into the water side of the 
HEATRIC heat exchanger in the emergency cooling system. The reactor power also is 
shown in the figures for comparison.  
 
Except for a period before t=2000s the ECS heat exchanger is able to remove all the 
decay power while the blower is running (before t=15000s). For the two success cases 
(#17 and 32) the energy removed by the ECS heat exchanger under natural circulation 
(for t > 15000s) is seen to approach the decay power towards the end of the simulation. 
 
6.2 Reactor and Guard Containment Pressures 
 
The pressures in the upper plenum of the reactor and the guard containment are shown in 
Figures 16a-c for the three transient cases. The early response (t < 500s) of the reactor  
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Figure 15a – Reactor Power and Emergency Heat Exchanger Heat Removal Rate. 
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Figure 15b – Reactor Power and Emergency Heat Exchanger Heat Removal Rate. 
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Figure 16a – Reactor and Guard Containment Pressures (Case 17). 
 
 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Time (s)
0
1e+06
2e+06
3e+06
4e+06
5e+06
6e+06
7e+06
8e+06
Pr
es
su
re
 (
Pa
)
Reactor
Guard Containment
p-58040000
p-70010000
Case 26
 
 
Figure 16b – Reactor and Guard Containment Pressures (Case 26). 
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Figure 16c – Reactor and Guard Containment Pressures (Case 32). 
 
pressure has been discussed previously in relation to Figure 12. During the early phase of 
the depressurization transient the helium flow through the break is choked and thus all 
three cases have similar reactor pressure until the point at which the reactor pressure 
equalizes with the guard containment pressure. The pressure equalization point occurs at 
a pressure of ~800kPa and at t=~1250s. The guard containment, owing to heat loss, is 
losing pressure slowly in time for transient Cases 17 and 26. At the end of the calculation, 
the difference in pressure between these two cases and the case of constant pressure 
boundary, Case 32, is ~140kPa.  
 
In a sensitivity case, Case 27 (similar to Case 26), the guard containment volume is 
reduced by 25.33% to 1512m3 at t=1000s. The change has negligible effect on the cross-
over pressure (the point at which reactor and guard containment pressure equalizes). The 
only appreciable effect is a slowing down of the guard containment depressurization after 
reaching the cross-over pressure.  
 
6.3 Guard Containment Gas Temperature 
 
The gas temperature inside the guard containment increases rapidly after the initiation of 
the depressurization accident because of the relatively low heat capacity of the gaseous 
atmosphere. The rate of temperature increase and the magnitude of the peak temperature 
depend directly on the rate and duration of energy addition to the guard containment. 
Thus the size of the break and the pressure of the reactor all play a role in the response of 
the guard containment gas temperature.  
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Figure 17 – Gas Temperature Inside the Guard Containment. 
 
A high gas temperature is of concern not only for the environmental qualification of 
equipment and instruments inside the guard containment but also for the structural 
integrity of the support structures and the guard containment itself. 
 
6.4 Peak Fuel Temperature 
 
Figure 18 shows the peak fuel temperature as a function of time for the three transient 
cases. The peak fuel temperature is obtained from the RELAP5-3D results by defining a 
control variable that searches for the maximum temperature for all fuel heat structures at 
all axial locations.  
 
Before the reactor scrams at t=148s there is a reduction in core flow due to system 
depressurization (see Figures 11 and 12 for pressure and flow respectively). This is 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in fuel temperature as shown in Figure 18. 
There is a rapid drop in fuel temperature after the reactor scram but the temperature starts 
to increase again after the compressors of the PCU have stopped running. The rate of 
temperature increase is abated slightly when the blower is turned on at t=420s. By about 
t=2000s the energy removal power of the ECS heat exchanger exceeds the decay power 
(see Figure 15a) and the fuel temperature starts to turn around in a downward trend. 
 
The peak fuel temperature is seen to be lower in Case 32 than the other two cases 
between t=2000s and 15000s. This is due to the higher blower flow in Case 32 as a result 
of higher helium density from the higher system pressure. 
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The accelerated drop in the peak fuel temperature at t=9010s is an artifact of the accident 
scenario that calls for the isolation of the PCU from the downcomer of the reactor. With 
this action the helium flow can no longer bypass through the PCU and the full blower 
flow is now directed to the core.  
 
The linear rate of decrease of the peak fuel temperature between t=10000s and 15000s is 
a reflection of the imposed liner decay in reactor power. 
 
At a state of reduced power and reduced pressure, the natural circulation flow is much 
lower than the blower flow and the effect is evident in the rapid increase in the peak fuel 
temperature after the mode of heat transfer has changed from forced to natural 
convection. 
 
The leveling off of the peak fuel temperature towards the end of the calculation is 
indicative of natural circulation cooling matching the energy output of the reactor. 
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Figure 18 – Peak Fuel Temperature Core-wide. 
 
6.5 Core Outlet Temperature 
 
The general trend of the core outlet temperature, as shown in Figure 19, resembles that of 
the peak fuel temperature in Figure 18. The similarity between the responses of these two 
temperatures is not surprising because the location of the peak fuel temperature is 
generally near the core outlet.  A discussion of the core outlet temperature response 
during the early phase of the transient (t < 500s) can be found in Section 5 of this report. 
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Figure 19 – Core Outlet Temperature. 
 
6.6 Core Inlet Temperature 
 
During the early phase of the depressurization transient (t < 500s) the core inlet 
temperature response is driven mainly by depressurization and re-pressurization of the 
vessel. A discussion of the early phase response (see Figure 14) has been given earlier in 
Section 5 of the report.  
 
From about t=2000s through t=15000s while the blower is running the heat removal rate 
of the ECS heat exchanger exceeds the decay power (see Figure 15a) and the core inlet 
temperature, as shown in Figure 20, is decreasing with time. The rate of temperature 
decrease becomes a little steeper at t=9000s when the shutdown power for the RELAP5 
calculation is specified by input with a rate of decrease that is faster than the normal 
decay power. 
 
At t=15000s the blower is turned off resulting in a sudden decrease in core flow followed 
by a transition to natural circulation (see Figure 22). The transition from forced to natural 
circulation flow causes a sudden jump in the core inlet temperature (due to reduced core 
cooling) followed by a gradual decrease as natural circulation flow cooling is established 
in the reactor.  
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Figure 20 – Core Inlet Temperature. 
 
6.7 Helium Flow 
 
The flow of helium in the PCU and the core during the early phase of the transient (t < 
500s) has been discussed and shown earlier in Figures 12 and 13 respectively. Figures 21 
and 22 illustrate the flow through the ECS heat exchanger and at the core outlet 
respectively from start to finish. 
 
The blower is running between t=420s and t=15000s. During this period of forced flow 
the blower flow velocity is kept constant at 3.5 m/s (an input value) and the mass flow 
rate is a function of the helium density which in turn depends on the pressure. As the 
system pressure decreases the helium flow rate also decreases. The flow rate for Case 32 
is higher than the other two cases because the constant guard containment pressure 
condition specified for Case 32 makes its system pressure higher than the other two 
cases. 
 
At t=9010s a trip valve is activated to isolate the cold duct of the PCU from the 
downcomer of the reactor. This action is intended to prevent helium flow from bypassing 
the core through the PCU and the trip valve is used to simulate the function of a check 
valve. With the PCU isolated there is an increase in core flow of 5 to 6 kg/s (see Figure 
22). 
 
Transition to natural circulation flow occurs at t=15000s when the blower is turned off. 
The effects of guard containment pressure and Reynolds number dependent spacer loss 
coefficient are evident in the natural circulation flow rate which has reached a quasi-
steady state value by the end of the calculation at t=25000s. It is noted here that the 
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reactor power is kept constant at 13.9748MW from t=15000s onward. This level of 
power is equivalent to the decay power 24 hours after shutdown. The flow rates at core 
exit at t=25000s are: 
 
Case 17: 4.20 kg/s (constant spacer loss coefficient) 
Case 26: 2.77 kg/s (Reynolds number dependent spacer loss coefficient) 
Case 32: 4.25 kg/s (Reynolds number dependent spacer loss coefficient and guard 
containment pressure set constant at 800kPa after t=1250s) 
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Figure 21 – Helium Flow through the ECS Heat Exchanger. 
 
Several parametric cases have been run to better understand the cause(s) behind the core 
bypass flow. They include making changes to flow paths inside the PCU and leading to 
the PCU, and modifying conditions of the coolers inside the PCU. All parametric cases 
are restarted from the transient run that created Case 17.  
 
In Case 18 instead of actuating a trip valve to isolate the PCU, as in Case 17, at t=9010s 
the turbine bypass valve in the PCU is reopened. The net effect is the creation of an 
additional flow path between the cold duct side and the hot duct side of the PCU, 
bypassing the coolers. There is little change in the core bypass flow when the turbine 
bypass line is reopened. This parametric case shows that with no compressor running the 
turbine bypass has little effect in reducing PCU flow. 
 
In Case 20 at t=9000s the cold duct of the ECS is relocated to the bottom of the 
downcomer, making the return of the cold helium closer to the core inlet. For this 
parametric case the PCU remains connected to the downcomer. There is again little 
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change in the flow to the PCU after the ECS return has been relocated. The calculation 
shows that the helium flows upward in the downcomer to reach the PCU.  
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Figure 22 – Helium Flow at Core Outlet. 
 
It is noted that the core bypass flow that goes to the PCU is on the order of a few kg/s 
(forced flow by the blower). When this bypass flow passes through the precooler and 
intercooler sections of the PCU the helium gas is essentially cooled down to the 
temperature of the cooling water (293K). In order to evaluate the effect of the cold 
centers on the bypass flow a parametric case is created with changes made to the thermal 
boundary conditions of the heat structures that represent the walls of the coolers. In Case 
23 an adiabatic boundary condition is imposed on the cooler walls, i.e. the coolers are 
insulated from the cooling water. In addition, the cooler wall temperature is re-initialized 
to 400.15K, a temperature representative of the helium gas before reaching the coolers. 
The changes are made at t=11000s and the blower is turned off at t=15000s to initiate 
transition to natural circulation. The transient calculation terminated at t=19841.4s when 
the maximum fuel temperature reached the threshold of 1600°C. The flow rates through 
the core and the PCU are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 3 – Case 23 Key Flows 
 
Time PCU Core (Inlet) 
15000s (Blower running) 4.5 kg/s 13.6 kg/s 
19841s (Natural Circulation) 4.06 kg/s 1.04 kg/s 
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 Results of Case 23 indicate the helium gas attains the cooler wall temperature (~400k) 
when it passes through the cooler sections. Changes made to the cooler boundary 
conditions however have apparently no effect on the core bypass flow and the magnitude 
of the core bypass flow (PCU flow) remains about the same before and after the blower is 
off. This parametric case demonstrates the detrimental effect of the core bypass flow, 
namely diverting cooling flow away from the core. One of the ways to prevent the core 
bypass flow is to use an isolation device such as a check valve to block off flow in the 
undesirable direction. 
 
6.8 Blower Power 
 
Blower power is another parameter aside from natural circulation flow rate that reflects 
directly the effect of the Reynolds dependent spacer loss coefficient. Figure 23 shows a 
higher power requirement for higher pressure losses. Higher pressure losses can be from 
higher flows, e.g. the situation of increased core flow at t=9010 when the PCU is isolated. 
Higher pressure loss can also be from the higher spacer loss coefficients, e.g. the 
implementation of Reynolds dependent spacer loss coefficient at t=1000s for Case 32 and 
at t=13000s for Case 26. The blower power requirement is on the order of 10 to 20kW 
when the system has reached a quasi-steady pressure of 600 to 800kPa. If the blower flow 
velocity is assumed a fixed value, the power requirement will increase with pressure 
because of higher gas density leading to higher pressure drop across the blower. 
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Figure 23 – Blower Power. 
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The system transient analyses reported here confirm the efficacy of the proposed hybrid 
active/passive combination approach to the GEN IV GFR shutdown decay heat removal 
event under the BDBA conditions. The accident sequence considered is a station blackout 
simultaneous with a small break/leak (10 sq. inch/0.0645m2) in the reactor vessel. The 
system consists of the reactor, the power conversion unit, the emergency cooling system, 
and the guard containment. System responses to the accident are simulated by using a 
new pre-release version of RELAP5-3D (2.4.1.1a) that has a component model for 
compressors.  
 
The cooling of the reactor can be divided into three time  phases during the 
depressurization accident. The first two phases are forced flow cooling with the 
circulating flow provided by the PCU during coast down in the first phase and the blower 
in the second phase. The final phase is passive cooling provide by natural circulation. 
 
 The RELAP5 calculations show that prior to reactor scram on low system pressure, and 
the time to scram could be prolonged for a small leak, the PCUs continue to provide 
adequate forced flow cooling of the core after the initiation of the break. The model also 
includes a turbine bypass line whose timely actuation and sufficient capacity are crucial 
in protecting the shaft of the PCU from over-speeding once the generator is tripped 
offline due to the reactor scram. Incomplete performance data for the PCU compressors 
prevents the calculation of the PCU coast down to proceed below a certain low flow 
value. In order to continue to the next phase of the calculation, the operation of the 
blower, the compressors are removed from the model when the coast down flow drops 
below 20% of the rated flow. This approximation is acceptable because forced flow 
cooling is restored momentarily once the blower is started. 
 
With an assumed blower flow velocity of 3.5m/s adequate core cooling is achieved for 
the first 24 hours after shutdown. The active power required to run the blower is a 
function of the flow velocity, flow resistance, and the system pressure. The calculation 
shows a power requirement of 10 to 20kW. This is quite small compared to designs for 
other reactor types. It can be provided by batteries and does not require generator startup. 
Compressed gas sources may be a possibility. 
 
Since all process parameters are evolving in a quasi-steady manner during the period of 
forced flow cooling by the blower it is possible to approach the next phase of the 
calculation at a faster pace. This is done by linearly decreasing the decay power down to 
the 24 hour level analytically when  the calculation time reaches 15000s.  
 
The final phase of decay heat removal commences when the stopping of the blower 
initiates the transition to natural circulation cooling. The magnitude of the natural 
circulation flow is a function of the buoyancy head between the hot and cold thermal 
centers, flow resistance, and system pressure. 
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The spacer form loss in the laminar flow range has proven to have a negative impact on 
the natural circulation flow. The reduction in flow is about 34% when laminar form loss 
is considered (comparing Case 17 and Case 26). 
 
A guard containment back pressure of 800kPa has been shown to be able to sustain 
sufficient natural circulation cooling to keep the fuel and core outlet temperatures in 
check. The increase in natural circulation flow is about 53% when the back pressure is 
increased from 660kPa to 800kPa (comparing Case 26 and Case 32). The constant back 
pressure condition assumed in Case 32 can be implemented by the use of a gas 
accumulator or a reduction in guard containment heat losses. A parametric calculation 
has been done to evaluate the effect of reducing the guard containment free volume on 
the response of the back pressure (Case 27). The result indicates a 25% reduction in the 
free volume has negligible effect on the cross-over pressure (the point at which reactor 
and guard containment pressure equalizes). The only appreciable effect is a slowing 
down of the guard containment depressurization after reaching the cross-over pressure. 
 
Core bypass flow has been shown to be a concern when substantial fractions of the 
natural circulation flow are diverted to the PCU. An isolation device such as a check 
valve can be installed to mitigate the bypass flow to the PCU. 
 
The cause of the core bypass flow is traced to the fact that under natural circulation the 
location of maximum pressure inside the reactor is in the downcomer region. There are 
two paths emerging from the downcomer, one going to the core and the other leading to 
the PCU via the cold duct. The latter path is the preferred passage for the natural 
circulation flow because of higher flow resistance in the core. Several parametric cases 
have been constructed to modify the thermal and hydraulic conditions of the bypass flow 
path to assess their impact on the bypass flow through the PCU. These include the re-
opening of the turbine bypass valve (Case 18), re-location of the  ECS return to the 
bottom of the downcomer (Case 20), and insulating the pre-cooler and intercooler (Case 
23). The parametric cases all fail to have any real impact on the core bypass flow. 
 
The first integrated analysis (reactor and PCU as a coupled system) presented in this 
report has confirmed the viability of the hybrid approach using a combination of  active 
and passive components to removal decay heat from a depressurized reactor. There 
remain some aspects of the design that need further investigation to reduce the 
uncertainty of the hybrid approach and they are summarized in the following bullets: 
 
• Create a blower model using the RELAP5 compressor component. 
• Implement a more comprehensive heat structure model for the reactor vessel and 
internals. 
• Update PCU component design data to better represent their thermal and 
hydraulic characteristics, in particular the performance data for compressors at 
high and low flow ranges. 
• Evaluate flow resistances in the PCU when flow is opposite to the normal 
direction. 
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• Evaluate different break/leak sizes and locations. 
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